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This paper proposes a behavioural framework to complement professional accounting
firms’ measures for managing conflicts of interest. Following an empirical examination of
the process through which conflicts of interest affect accounting professionals’ decision-
making, we develop guidance for practitioners that will enable them to incorporate be-
havioural interventions while establishing the context, assessing, treating, controlling and
monitoring conflicts of interest. The interventions are aimed at strengthening account-
ing professionals’ independence in fact by increasing the professionals’ expectation that
compliant decision-making will result in positive outcomes, increasing their perception
that making compliant decisions is less difficult than making the alternative decisions,
facilitating the formation of highly ethical judgements and lowering their propensity to
disengage.
The data were collected through a quasi-experiment with 105 professionals from the Big
Four accounting firms in the UK. Our work offers practical implications for professional
accountants, executive directors, regulatory bodies, executive training and academic re-
search. Other professions facing the ramifications of conflicts of interest (e.g. law, en-
gineering, medicine and architecture) may also use the proposed framework to improve
their ethics policies and corporate governance codes for managing conflicts of interest.
Introduction
The accumulative levels of ‘noise and bias’ in
judgement can increase business and operational
risk (Kahneman et al., 2016). Notably, one of the
principal assumptions underlying professional ac-
counting function is that professionals will act eth-
ically, especially concerning their independence –
this, however, is not always the case. Although
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professional accounting firms are heavily regulated
in relation to managing the risk of conflicts of in-
terest, the existing measures are criticized for not
being able to address professionals’ independence
in fact.1 The current accounting literature suggests
that the focus of existing regulation is on mak-
ing professionals appear independent to the pub-
lic (i.e. independence in appearance2); this is one of
1The independence of an accounting professional is about
them taking an unbiased viewpoint in performing audit
tests, evaluating results and issuing audit reports (Arens,
Beasley and Elder, 2002). Independence also implies free-
dom from conflicts of interest (Nelson, 2004). Indepen-
dence in fact denotes actual objectivity and a state of mind
characterized by the professional’s lack of bias and in-
tegrity (Dopuch et al., 2003; Salehi, 2009).
2Independence in appearance is about the public’s percep-
tion that an accounting professional (and the accounting
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the reasons why the accounting profession invites
public scrutiny. Extant research (e.g. Guiral et al.,
2010; Ishaque, 2019; Moore et al., 2005, 2006)
suggests that conflicts of interest lead to biased
decision-making and that more than regulatory ef-
forts are required. Some studies suggest that a be-
havioural framework which addresses the socio-
psychological and cognitive attributes of decision-
makers can provide a better insight into account-
ing professionals’ judgements and decision choices
(Bobek, Hageman and Radtke, 2015; Cohen et al.,
2012; Naranjo-Gil et al., 2012; Pasewark and Via-
tor, 2006; Persellin, 2013; Robertson, 2010).
Accounting professionals, like any other hu-
mans, are unreliable decision-makers due to cog-
nitive bias, noise and heuristics in their decision-
making process. The ubiquity of bias, noise
and heuristics in decision-making influences the
perception and judgement of professionals and
thus alters the cognition equation (Kahneman
et al., 2016). Recent evidence (e.g. Adler and
Liyanarachchi, 2020; de Graaf, 2019; Fairchild,
Gwilliam and Marnet, 2019) supports a paradigm
shift that focuses on the behavioural aspects of ac-
counting professionals rather than on economic
and institutional models. For instance, Fairchild,
Gwilliam and Marnet (2019) assert that the ex-
isting standards, codes and regulations fall short
in addressing corporate governance challenges, es-
pecially in the field of auditing. Besides, in ad-
dition to economic incentives, policy-makers and
scholars need to consider the impact of socio-
psychological and emotional factors on corpo-
rate decision-making and performance. Some ear-
lier studies (e.g. Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Cain,
Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Clements, Neill
and Stovall, 2012; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman,
2010; Nelson, 2004) also suggest that conflicts of
interest can be managed effectively if complemen-
tary behaviouralmeasures are implemented for ad-
dressing independence in fact. Moore et al. (2006)
and Ayal and Gino (2012) suggest that account-
ing professionals’ independence in fact can be ad-
dressed by understanding how the relationship be-
tween conflicts of interest and decision-making
behaviour is channelled through their cognitive
processes.
Our study contributes to the behavioural ac-
counting and ethics literature in five ways. First, it
firm) is objective in conduct and forms impartial judge-
ments (Dopuch et al., 2003; Salehi, 2009).
advances the recent behavioural accounting litera-
ture by providing empirical evidence for how con-
flicts of interest affect accounting professionals’
decision-making behaviour. Second, it combines
social cognitive theory3 (Bandura, 2008) with the
throughput model of decision-making4 (Rodgers
and Fayi, 2019) to explain the relationship be-
tween the conflicts of interest and accounting pro-
fessionals’ likelihood of engaging in compliant
decision-making. Third, it provides an account
of how accounting professionals’ positive out-
come expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical
judgement affect their decision-making behaviour.
Fourth, it highlights the role of accounting pro-
fessionals’ perceptual bias, noise and heuristics in
their decision-making behaviour. Finally, follow-
ing the discussion of the empirical results, a risk
management perspective is adopted to develop a
behavioural framework that complements profes-
sional accounting firms’ measures for managing
conflicts of interest. The accounting literature suf-
fers from a huge insufficiency of research on the
relevance of bias, noise and heuristics to risk man-
agement around conflicts of interest. Thus, our
aim – to propose a framework that can be used
as a guide for practitioners to encourage compli-
ant decision-making while improving riskmanage-
ment efforts around conflicts of interest – is both
timely and relevant.
Empirical data were collected through a web-
based quasi-experiment with 105 professionals
from the Big Four accounting firms in the UK.
These professionals included partners, members
of the management board, directors and statu-
tory auditors. The study’s model has been tested
using SmartPLS 3 analysis software. Our study
provides a unique insight into accounting profes-
sionals’ decision-making behaviour; it also pro-
poses various interventions (using statistical mod-
els) that will enable these professionals to assess,
treat, control and monitor conflicts of interest in
an effective way. The interventions are proposed
3Social cognitive theory establishes that human behaviour
is regulated through cognitive processes in a given social
context (for details, see Bandura, 1986, 1991, 1999, 2006,
2008).
4The throughput model of decision-making draws on the
concept of process thinking, which suggests that decision-
making behaviour is characterized by the interaction of
four concepts, i.e. information, perception, judgement
and decision choice (for details, see Rodgers, 1997, 2006,
2009) and Rodgers and Fayi (2019).
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to increase the instances of compliant behaviour
by encouraging the following amongst profession-
als: (i) the expectation that the positive outcomes
of compliant decision-making will outweigh the
negative outcomes; (ii) the perception that making
compliant decisions is less difficult than making
alternative decisions; (iii) the formation of highly
ethical judgements; and (iv) a low propensity to
morally disengage.
The next section will review the literature rele-
vant to this study. The third section will detail the
theoretical framework this study builds on. The
data collection, analysis procedures and empiri-
cal results will be included in the fourth section.
Following on from the insights revealed, the fifth
section will propose a behavioural framework for
managing the risk of conflicts of interest in pro-
fessional accounting firms. Finally, the paper con-
cludes in the sixth section.
Literature review
Some cognitive psychologists (e.g. Kahneman and
Tversky, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) ad-
vise that judgement and decision choice are heuris-
tic exercises, which are conditioned by the indi-
vidual’s cognitive bias, perception and intuitive as-
sessment of the probability of the desired out-
comes. One of the assumptions fundamental to
professional accounting function is that account-
ing professionals will act ethically, independently
and in strict compliance with the rules. In prac-
tice, however, accounting professionals are usually
confronted with judgement calls, in which they are
guided by their informal experiences and personal
values rather than rigid accounting rules. This im-
plies that, due to the cognitive bias and noise
in subjective judgement, professional accountants
may contradict their own judgement when faced
with the same data on different occasions. In this
regard, Kahneman et al. (2016) suggest that ‘noise
and bias’ may distort professionals’ judgement;
this consequently increases business and opera-
tional risk.
A common theme that dominates many dis-
cussions regarding the causes of recent account-
ing scandals centres around poor/unethical pro-
fessional behaviour (Bhattacharjee, Maletta and
Moreno, 2017; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004;
Robertson, 2010). There is a thriving debate in the
extant corporate governance literature regarding
the behaviour of accounting professionals and the
efficacy of the current corporate governancemech-
anism. For instance, Cohen et al. (2012) argue that
the overt behaviour of some directors and other
accounting professionals, especially those from the
Big Four, has undermined – and will continue to
undermine – the effectiveness of the Sarbanes–
Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 and other corporate gov-
ernance codes. Other similar studies (e.g. Bhat-
tacharjee,Maletta andMoreno, 2017; Bobek et al.,
2016; Persellin, 2013) show that strengthening ex-
isting corporate governance codes, together with
extended layers of legislation, has not been able to
reduce the level of abuse and reoccurrence of cor-
porate scandals.
In furtherance to the aforementioned argu-
ments, Fairchild, Gwilliam and Marnet (2019)
assert that our ability to understand and im-
prove the ‘mindset’ and behavioural attributes
of those charged with governance can provide
a better result. As in every other human being,
the mental map of accounting professionals is
governed by behavioural factors that are cogni-
tively driven. These behavioural factors can be
psychological (Naranjo-Gil et al., 2012; Persellin,
2013; Robertson, 2010; Tian, Tuttle and Xu,
2015), social (Bobek, Hageman and Radtke, 2015;
Bobek et al., 2016; Pasewark and Viator, 2006)
and combinations of socio-psychological and pro-
fessional factors (Bandura, 2008; Bobek, Hage-
man and Radtke, 2015). Therefore, the extant
literature suggests that a deeper understanding
of cognitive factors is crucial in enhancing the
effectiveness of corporate governance and risk
management.
Fairchild, Gwilliam and Marnet (2019) exam-
ined cases of audit failure and posited that be-
havioural remedies (i.e. a deeper understanding of
managing the behavioural factors that systemati-
cally distort judgement and decision-making in the
event of conflicting interests) can provide a better
solution to corporate abuse. Their work highlights
the need for behavioural and cognitive measures to
complement the traditional regulatory approaches
implemented to manage the risk of conflicts of in-
terest. Previous studies on corporate governance
effectiveness have, more or less, looked at conflicts
of interest from a ‘rational’ rather than a ‘social
cognitive’ perspective. Some other researchers (e.g.
Ayal and Gino, 2012; Bazerman and Gino, 2012;
Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012; Cremer et al.,
2011; Ishaque, 2020;Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman,
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2010) have examined conflicts of interest from
psychological and cognitive perspectives. These
studies suggest managing conflicts of interest by
using behavioural interventions to strengthen ac-
counting professionals’ independence in fact. How-
ever, extant research does not offer behavioural
frameworks to complement the existing measures
that professional accounting firms adopt to man-
age conflicts of interest.
The ubiquity of cognitive bias, noise and heuris-
tics in the decision-making process, which occurs
in the earlier stages of the cognition process, sub-
consciously influences the perception and judge-
ment of professionals and thus alters the cogni-
tion equation before conflicts of interest even raise
concerns. In this regard, Andersen and Hjortskov
(2016) and Butler (2016) state that judgements are
influenced by heuristic bias, which is predicated on
the reflective and intuitive dual-process thinking
mode of a decision-maker. Since conflicts of in-
terest are a key risk that has legal ramifications,
extant research (e.g. Bedard et al., 2008; di Flo-
rio, 2012; Guiral et al., 2010; Johnson andHansen,
2011; Lo and Field, 2009; Moore, Tanlu and Baz-
erman, 2010; Thagard, 2007) considers conflicts of
interest as a risk and suggests the adoption of the
risk management perspective. Importantly, the In-
ternational Ethics Standards Board for Accoun-
tants (IESBA, 2018) supports the idea of man-
aging conflicts of interest as a risk characteristic
of the professional accounting environment. How-
ever, the accounting literature suffers from a huge
insufficiency of research on the relevance of bias,
noise and heuristics to risk management around
conflicts of interest.
We argue that conflicts of interest are a be-
havioural and complex cognitive phenomenon,
which should be captured by a comprehensive
analytical framework. However, studies that fo-
cus on the behavioural aspects of professional
accountants are limited and sparse. In this re-
gard, Fairchild, Gwilliam and Marnet (2019) call
for experimental research that examines the be-
havioural nudges influencing the judgement and
decision choices of accounting professionals. Our
study responds to the concurrent calls for further
research and gaps in the extant literature by ad-
vancing understanding of the operation of con-
flicts of interest at the level of an individual ac-
counting professional, proposing a behavioural
framework for managing the risk of conflicts of
interest.
Theoretical framework
The main theoretical stance underpinning this
study is the argument that professional judgement
is governed by the interplay of multi-faceted com-
binations of behavioural micro-elements, such as
self-interest, socio-cognitive structures and profes-
sional ethics. According to Bandura (1991, 2006,
2008), self-interest is automatic, often unconscious
and viscerally compelling. The automaticity of
self-interest gives it a primal power to govern an
individual’s judgement, thus making it difficult for
decision-makers to eradicate its influence on their
judgement. In agreement with Bandura’s view,
Moore, Tanlu andBazerman (2010) andTian, Tut-
tle and Xu (2015) suggest that the social cogni-
tive landscape of a decision-maker is driven by sets
of psychological sub-functions that can influence
their professional judgement. These psycholog-
ical micro-foundations5 include self-monitoring
one’s behaviour (i.e. individuals monitoring what
determines and/or affects their behaviour), self-
reflection (i.e. individuals reflecting on their be-
haviour in relation to personal standards and
environmental circumstances) and affective self-
reaction (i.e. individuals possessing self-reflective
and self-reactive cognitive capabilities that enable
them to exercise control over their thoughts, moti-
vations and actions). Behaviour, therefore, is gov-
erned by the automatic as well as the controlled
cognitive processes.
Against the backdrop of the above discus-
sions, this study posits that the behavioural at-
tributes of accounting professionals are shaped
by an interplay of internal factors, which are
self-generated and external factors (i.e. secondary
interest,6 socio-cognitive factors, social environ-
ment and professional ethics compliance, etc.).
Professional accountants have to perform their
5The terms ‘behavioural micro-elements’, ‘psychological
sub-functions’ and ‘psychological micro-foundations’
capture decision-makers’ person-centric perspective,
which influences their judgement. The person-centric
perspective involves behavioural issues, such as self-
interest, opportunistic behaviour, limited rationality,
etc., which influence individual judgements (Gond et al.,
2017).
6Secondary interests are characterized by different threats
to compliance within the fundamental principles of pro-
fessional ethics. These include self-interest threat, intimi-
dation threat, self-review threat, familiarity threat and ad-
vocacy threat (IESBA, 2015, 2018).
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professional responsibilities within the parameters
of their ethical obligations. One of the central ar-
guments in this study is that conflicts of interest
take place when professional responsibilities clash
with secondary interests. However, understanding
the dynamics of the causal processes involved (i.e.
the cognitive footprint or behavioural aspects of
conflicts of interest) requires a better behavioural
framework that can capture the key cognitive con-
stituents of the risk of conflicting interests. This
study attempts to provide an answer to this chal-
lenge.
As a precursor to developing a behavioural
framework, it is essential to understand the process
through which conflicts of interest threaten ac-
counting professionals’ compliant behaviour. This
is because the proposed behavioural interventions
should ideally be backed by empirical evidence
for the relationship between conflicts of interest
and decision-making and the role of accounting
professionals’ mental processes in their decision-
making. Extant research highlights the signifi-
cance of unveiling the cognitive mechanisms that
underlie decision-making behaviour. For instance,
Tenbrunsel (2005) suggests that understanding
conflicts of interest is about recognizing the cog-
nitive obstacles to compliant decision-making and
then finding out how to overcome these barriers.
This is because cognitive bias, noise and heuristics
can influence accounting professionals’ perception
and judgement in relation to the weight they place
on evidence/facts before any conflict of interest
even enters the equation. Similarly, a recent study
by Guest (2019) highlights the cognitive conflicts
that diverse decision-making groups incur due to
their differing cognitive beliefs and attitudes.
By integrating social cognitive theory and the
throughput model of decision-making (Figure 1),
this study adopts the stimulus–organism–response
(SOR) paradigm7 (Holt et al., 2015) to understand
the process through which conflicts of interest af-
fects accounting professionals’ decision-making.
The main reason for this combination stems
from the fact that experiencing a conflict of in-
terest is a cognitive phenomenon, which is influ-
enced by the information available to accounting
7The SOR paradigm highlights that ‘in the face of the
stimuli, organisms form the cognitive representations (i.e.
perceptions and judgements) of the world, and respond
through their conduct, actions or behaviour’ (Holt et al.,
2015).
professionals and their perceptions, judgements
and decision choices (Rodgers, 2009; Rodgers and
Gago, 2001, 2006). Further, the cognitive foot-
prints of organizational decision-makers are con-
ditioned by social/environmental structures (Ban-
dura, 2006, 2008). In comparison to the classic
stimulus–response (SR) paradigm (Holland, 2008)
to examining behaviour, which is a classic and
rather obsolete view, the SOR paradigm (Holt
et al., 2015) allows researchers to examine cogni-
tive processes (e.g. POE, PD, EJ) representing the
‘organism’ dimension, with conflicts of interest as
the ‘stimulus’ and compliant decision-making be-
haviour as the ‘response’.
Previous research highlights the viability of so-
cial cognitive theory and the throughput model
in investigations of the cognitive processes of ac-
counting professionals. For instance, within the
bounds of social cognitive theory, some schol-
ars (e.g. Afifah et al., 2015; Agle et al., 2014;
Cheng and Chu, 2013; Iskandar and Sanusi, 2011;
Juhari et al., 2013; Wongpinunwatana and Pan-
choo, 2014) suggest the need for further stud-
ies of accounting professionals’ positive outcome
expectancy in relation to compliant decision-
making, perceived difficulty in making compliant
decisions and ethical judgements. Moreover, other
studies (e.g. Guiral et al., 2010; Moore, Tanlu and
Bazerman, 2010; Rodgers and Fayi, 2019) high-
light the usefulness of the throughput model for
examining the role of bias, noise and heuristics in
the decision-making process. These studies help in
examining the different decision-making pathways
(characterized by the interaction of information,
perception and judgement) that accounting profes-
sionals adopt when making decisions.
Arguably, the combination of social cognitive
theory with the throughput model offers advan-
tages in terms of the better predictive and ex-
planatory powers of the resultingmodels (Ishaque,
2020).8 This approach adds to the extant litera-
ture by adopting a comprehensive cognitive ap-
proach to examine the process through which con-
flicts of interest affects accounting professionals’
decision-making behaviour. Notably, accounting
8Our theoretical framework is derived from Ishaque
(2020), which combines social cognitive theory with the
throughput model of decision-making. The study exam-
ines a different combination of variables, each motivated
by a different aim, and with a different contribution to the
current professional accounting literature.
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Figure 1. Theoretical model
practitioners’ failure to address conflicts of inter-
est and the associated cognitive bias, noise and
heuristics, which permeate the fabric of strategic
decision-making,may lead to another financial cri-
sis. Therefore, we employ a theoretical framework
that enhances our understanding of how conflicts
of interest operate at the level of an individual pro-
fessional, and allows us to examine the relevance
of bias, noise and heuristics to risk management
around conflicts of interest.
Materials and methods
Research instrument
Individual accounting professionals are the unit
of analysis in our study. Empirical data were col-
lected from 105 professionals from the Big Four
accounting firms in the UK through a re-
peated measures quasi-experiment (web-based)
comprised of four vignettes. The vignettes are de-
rived from the Ethical Dilemmas Case Studies by
the UK and Ireland’s Consultative Committee of
Accountancy Bodies (2011). These case studies
provide guidance on what constitutes ‘compliant’
and ‘deviant’ behaviour in a given ethical dilemma
that minimizes researchers’ subjectivity. The re-
search instrument, detailing the vignettes andmea-
surement of variables, is presented in Appendix A
in the online supporting information.
The independent variable is represented by the
conflicts of interest as manipulated across four
different threats to compliance with fundamen-
tal principles of professional ethics (IESBA, 2015,
2018). Vignette 1 involves conflicts of interest due
to a self-interest threat (CoI-1); vignette 2 involves
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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conflicts of interest due to an intimidation threat
(CoI-2); vignette 3 involves conflicts of interest due
to a combination of self-interest and self-review
threats (CoI-3); and vignette 4 involves conflicts
of interest due to a combination of self-interest, in-
timidation, self-review and familiarity threats (CoI-
4). CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4 represent the
four categories of conflicts of interest considered
in this study. A total of four interviews were con-
ducted with accounting professionals, one from
each of the Big Four accounting firms, to iden-
tify these categories as being the most relevant to
an accounting professional’s compliant decision-
making behaviour.
In all four vignettes, the likelihood of making
a compliant decision (CD) is the dependent vari-
able representing the decision choice that conforms
with the primary interest of the accounting pro-
fession.9 The intervening situational cognitive con-
structs include accounting professionals’ expecta-
tion that the overall positive outcomes of compli-
ant decision-making will outweigh the overall neg-
ative outcomes (POE), accounting professionals’
perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision
(PD) and their judgement about the ethicality of
compliant decision choices (EJ).
Occupational self-efficacy (OSE) and the
propensity to morally disengage (PMD) have
been statistically controlled for as representing the
dispositional cognitive constructs of accounting
professionals (Afifah et al., 2015; Agle et al.,
2014; Bandura, 2002; Cabrera-Frias, 2012; Moore
et al., 2012; Palmer, 2013; Rigotti, Schyns and
Mohr, 2008). OSE represents accounting pro-
fessionals’ perceived ability to successfully cope
with occupation-related challenges and tasks, while
PMD represents accounting professionals’ ten-
dency to consider unethical behaviour as ethically
acceptable.
9The primary interest of the accounting profession is
characterized by serving in the best interests of the public,
including investors, prospective investors, lending banks,
credit agencies and government regulators (Oseni, 2011).
According to Pierce (2007) and Clements et al. (2012), the
primary responsibility of professional accounting firms is
to serve and protect the public interest by reporting on
the fairness of clients’financial statements. The regulatory
perspective holds that compliance with the fundamen-
tal principles of the accounting profession (i.e. integrity,
objectivity, professional competence, due care, confiden-
tiality and professional behaviour) constitutes the pri-
mary interest of the accounting profession (IESBA, 2015,
2018).
Model assessment
Using SmartPLS 3, path analysis was adopted
as a statistical technique to analyse the empiri-
cal data.10 Separate models were run for each of
the four categories of conflict of interest: CoI-1,
CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4. The model was first as-
sessed through the examination of different cri-
teria, including the coefficients of determination
(R2), path coefficients (β), effect size (f2), predic-
tive relevance (Q2), goodness of model fit (using
standardized root mean square residuals, SRMR),
multicollinearity and common method bias (using
variance inflation factor, VIF). Except for POE,
the R2, f2 and Q2 values are in accordance with the
acceptable thresholds in the relevant literature (e.g.
Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2013;Henseler, Hubona
and Ray, 2016; Kock, 2015; Kock and Lynn, 2012;
Roth, 2012). The contextual factors, including reg-
ulation, policies and compliance codes, are im-
portant predictors of POE in the professional ac-
counting environment (Ishaque, 2020) and the low
values of R2, f2 and Q2 reflect that the only path
leading to POE, in our model, is conflict of inter-
est.
Overall, evaluation of the assessment criteria
provides evidence that this study’s model holds
predictive accuracy and relevance, predicts the out-
come significantly well, fits the empirical data well
and conveys the intended information. This im-
plies that the estimates obtained from this study’s
model are meaningful and that the conclusions
drawn are not susceptible to doubt. Appendix B
in the online supporting information presents the
results of model assessment.
Empirical results
Figure 2 presents the model that has been tested
for empirical evidence of the relationship be-
tween conflicts of interest and compliant decision-
making and the role of accounting profession-
als’ mental processes in their compliant decision-
making behaviour (CD). The model testing results
are tabulated in Appendix C in the online support-
ing information.
10Our choice of SmartPLS 3 to perform path analysis
has been informed by Hair et al. (2011) and Lowry and
Gaskin (2014).
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
8 M. Ishaque, R. Attah-Boakye and F. Yusuf
Figure 2. Conflicts of interest and compliant decision-making behaviour
The empirical results11 show that accounting
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of com-
pliant decision-making (POE), perceived difficulty
in making compliant decisions (PD) and ethical
judgements (EJ) play a mediating role in the rela-
tionship between conflicts of interest (CoI) and the
likelihood of compliant decision-making behaviour
(CD). High POE, low PD and high EJ are evi-
denced to be the situational cognitive predictors,
while low propensity to morally disengage (PMD) is
the dispositional cognitive predictor of CD.More-
over, POE, PD and EJ interact to affect account-
ing professionals’ decision-making in the event of
conflicts of interest – specifically, high POE leads
11The empirical results have been included but are not in-
terpreted as being ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, since this is be-
yond the scope of this paper. The key insights suggested
by these results have been considered in order to develop
a behavioural framework, which is the aim of this paper.
to low PD and high EJ, and low PD leads to high
EJ. During this process, conflict of interest plays
a biasing role in the decision-making process. Pro-
fessionals’ POE and PD serve as sources of per-
ceptual bias, noise and heuristics, and are demon-
strated to be largely unintentional.
The results provide evidence that conflicts of
interest in professional accounting firms threaten
accounting professionals’ adoption of compliant
decision-making behaviour. Importantly, this pro-
cess is governed through the agency of the profes-
sionals’ POE, PD and EJ. Specifically, the likeli-
hood of compliant decision-making is high in case
of accounting professionals who perceive the pos-
itive outcomes of compliant decision-making to
outweigh the negative outcomes, perceive less diffi-
culty inmaking the given compliant decision, form
a judgement that the compliant decision choice is
the most ethical, and have a low propensity to con-
sider unethical behaviour as acceptable. Notably,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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the results for the different categories of conflict of
interest converge to reveal the same insights; this
is evidence that, in principle, various categories of
conflict of interest affect decision-making in a sim-
ilar manner.
Therefore, the findings of this study may well be
generalized across other similar categories of con-
flict of interest.
Behavioural framework: interventions
for managing conflicts of interest
In agreement with Kahneman et al. (2016), our
empirical results for the role of accounting pro-
fessionals’ mental processes in their compliant
decision-making behaviour suggest that the accu-
mulative levels of bias and noise in judgement can
increase the level of risk, including the negative ef-
fect of conflicts of interest on compliant decision-
making. Having found that accounting profession-
als’ adoption of compliant decision-making (CD)
is governed by the agency of their positive outcome
expectancy (POE), perceived difficulty in mak-
ing compliant decisions (PD) and ethical judge-
ments (EJ), and also affected by their propen-
sity to morally disengage (PMD), we propose a
behavioural framework that can be conceptual-
ized as a managerial decision-making support sys-
tem. Since accounting professionals’ POE, PD and
PMD serve as the sources of cognitive bias, heuris-
tics and noise, these affect their state of mind and,
as a result, their independence in fact.
Conflict of interest is a key risk that has le-
gal ramifications; however, our review of the lit-
erature (e.g. Bhattacharjee, Maletta and Moreno,
2017; Bobek et al., 2016; Persellin, 2013) high-
lights that strengthening existing corporate gov-
ernance codes, together with extended layers of
legislation, has not been sufficient to reduce the
level of abuse and reoccurrence of corporate scan-
dals. Therefore, from a risk management perspec-
tive, our proposed behavioural interventions are
aimed at strengthening accounting professionals’
independence in fact to facilitate effective manage-
ment of conflicts of interest. Therefore, building
on the insights provided by our findings, a com-
plementary behavioural framework has been de-
veloped to propose various interventions at the
typical stages of establishing the context, assess-
ing (i.e. identifying, analysing and evaluating),
treating, controlling and monitoring conflicts of
interest. Importantly, as suggested by some other
scholars (e.g. Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Moore,
Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Williford and Small,
2013), practitioners may adopt such intervention
mechanisms to lessen the damaging effects of con-
flicts of interest.
The highlights of our proposed behavioural
framework (Figure 3) are as follows.
1. When establishing the context for managing
conflicts of interest, accounting firms may con-
sider introducing interventions aimed at encour-
aging high POE, low PD and high EJ. Accord-
ing to Bandura (2008), this could be achieved
by introducing such adjustments to the environ-
ment/context that are likely to encourage high
POE, low PDand high EJ. In this regard, the possi-
ble adjustments could be: applying ethical codes of
conduct to facilitate the adoption of compliant be-
haviour (Adams, Tashchian and Shore, 2001; Baz-
erman and Gino, 2012; Clements, Neill and Sto-
vall, 2012), implementing a strong ethics and com-
pliance programme (Williford and Small, 2013)
and organizational culture to reinforce ethical con-
duct (di Florio, 2012) and aligning reward systems
with the primary interests of the profession, such
that compliant behaviour is rewarded and deviant
behaviour punished (Amali, 2010; Green and Zim-
iles, 2013). Arguably, such interventions are likely
to promote compliant decision-making behaviour.
Rodgers and Fayi (2019) posit that the decision-
making process of professional accountants is gov-
erned by the codes of conduct constructed by
professional accounting bodies. Thus, the ethical
codes of professional conduct provide a cognitive
‘map line’ through which professional accountants
interpret, sort, arrange, rank and rate information
for decision-making.
2.When assessing (i.e. identifying, analysing and
evaluating) conflicts of interest, practitioners may
consider taking into consideration the predictive
powers of accounting professionals’ cognitive pro-
cesses. Specifically, high POE → CD, low PD →
CD, high EJ → CD, high POE → low PD and
high EJ, high PD → less EJ and low PMD → CD.
This implies that the identification of the sources,
causes, consequences and likely impact of conflicts
of interest is bound to be affected by accounting
professionals’ cognitive processes. As such, there
is a need to determine the level (i.e. high versus
low) of the said cognitive predictors. This could be
achieved through electronic decision aids (Pierce
and Sweeney, 2004), which might be customized to
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 3. Behavioural framework for managing conflicts of interest [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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include some checklists or measures for the levels
of POE, PD, EJ and PMD of accounting profes-
sionals.
Similarly, a review of firms’ codes of con-
duct (Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012), ethics
and compliance programmes (Williford and Small,
2013), organizational culture (di Florio, 2012;
Nguyen, Nguyen and Sila, 2019) and reward sys-
tems (Green and Zimiles, 2013) can also be indica-
tive of the probable level of accounting profession-
als’POE, PD andEJ in relation to the task at hand.
Consultation units within the firm (Trotman and
Wright and Wright, 2005) might also provide sup-
port in this regard.
3. Firms’ decision to adopt a particular treat-
ment of conflicts of interest may well be informed
by the fact that decision-making in the face of con-
flicts of interest is largely prone to bias. Particu-
larly, the findings show that bias threatens compli-
ant behaviour andmaywell inform decisions to ac-
cept, avoid, share or reduce the risk of conflicts of
interest. If interventions at the stages of establish-
ing the context and assessing conflicts of interest
suggest that the likelihood of compliant decision-
making is high, firms might resort to accepting or
reducing the risk of conflicts of interest. Similarly,
if the level of accounting professionals’ cognitive
processes indicates that the likelihood of compli-
ant decision-making behaviour is low, firms might
want to avoid situations that give rise to conflicts
of interest.
When implementing treatment for conflicts of
interest, quality control reviews and inspections
(Bedard et al., 2008) and consultation units (Trot-
man and Wright and Wright, 2005) might also be
helpful.
4. The empirical results show that accounting
professionals’ low POE, high PD, low EJ and
high PMD serve as cognitive barriers to compli-
ant decision-making. Moreover, their perceptual
bias plays a crucial role in the entire decision-
making process. In this regard, the implementa-
tion of the process thinking approach (Rodgers and
Gago, 2001, 2006) as one of the control measures
seems promising. This approach suggests alerting
professionals to the pathway they use to arrive
at a decision and increasing their awareness of
the obstacles and shortcuts they encounter during
decision-making. Such awareness provides a con-
structive way for accounting professionals to for-
mulate bias into a successful strategy.
Tenbrunsel (2005) suggests that effective man-
agement of conflicts of interest can be achieved
if accounting professionals can recognize the cog-
nitive barriers to compliant decision-making and
then find ways to overcome these barriers. This
could be achieved through various interventions,
including the provision of training (di Florio,
2012; Williford and Small, 2013) to raise aware-
ness about the psycho-cognitive barriers to com-
pliant behaviour. The use of electronic decision
aids (Dowling, 2009) might also help to reduce in-
stances of biased decision-making.
5. Finally, the interventions introduced in the
entire process of managing conflicts of interest
require review and continuous improvement. In
this regard, the potential benefits of accounting
consultation units (Iyer and Rama, 2004; Kadous,
Kennedy and Peecher, 2003), quality control re-
views (Ayers and Kaplan, 2003), peer reviews (Be-
dard et al., 2008) andwhistleblowing (Curtis, 2006)
are well documented in the extant literature.
Due to their potential to strengthen account-
ing professionals’ independence in fact, we expect
that the adoption of the interventions proposed
in this study’s behavioural framework will facili-
tate the effective management of conflicts of in-
terest. This, in turn, will contribute towards en-
couraging compliant decision-making behaviour
in the professional accounting environment. Im-
portantly, accounting practitioners may consider
our behavioural interventions in conjunction with
Kahneman et al.’s (2016) work on bringing dis-
cipline into judgement with the help of artificial
intelligence or algorithms. One of the most rad-
ical ways of mitigating cognitive bias, noise and
heuristics is to replace human judgement with for-
mal rules known as algorithms. Kahneman et al.
(2016) suggested the following five steps: (a) se-
lect six to eight variables that are distinctly related
to the predicted outcomes; (b) compute the mean
and standard deviation of each variable in the set;
(c) compute a standard score for each variable in
the set using the mean difference and the standard
deviation; (d) compute a summary score for each
case by using the average of each variable stan-
dard score; and (e) rank the sets from high to low
summary scores and determine the appropriate ac-
tions for different scores. After the above five stages
have been completed, the algorithm can compute
a summary score for each new case and generate a
decision.
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Our proposed framework provides important
suggestions for enhancing the effectiveness of pro-
fessional training through the introduction of vari-
ous complementary behavioural interventions. Ev-
idence from our empirical findings can be used
to reinforce professional bodies’ codes of con-
duct and ethical training. For instance, profes-
sional ethics training should be extended to cover
the wider cognitive aspects of professional judge-
ments, such as managing noise in judgement and
reducing cognitive bias and heuristics. Similarly,
since different pathways in decision-making can
yield useful results, the risk management efforts
around conflicts of interest may well be improved.
Further, our results reinforce the awareness that
cognitive bias, noise and heuristics have the po-
tential to create serious hidden costs for firms –
therefore, thorough attention to mitigating these
elements should be a matter of urgency. Finally,
our behavioural frameworkmay support firms that
want to replace key strategic judgements with arti-
ficial intelligence or algorithms.We suggest various
steps that can be used for the training and develop-
ment of key strategic staff.
Conclusions, implications and future
directions
Despite being heavily regulated, conflicts of in-
terest in the professional accounting environment
largely threaten accounting professionals’ adop-
tion of compliant decision-making behaviour. The
main reasons for this, as suggested by the ex-
tant literature, are the focus on accounting pro-
fessionals’ independence in appearance rather than
their independence in fact and the lack of con-
sideration of their perceptual bias. Our work in-
vites professional accounting bodies and regula-
tors (e.g. the Financial Reporting Council, FRC
and the International Federation of Accountants,
IFAC) to pay attention to the importance of im-
plementing the behavioural risk management ap-
proach to address conflicts of interest. Currently,
the regulators’ ethics provisions remain devoid
of robust behavioural interventions that could be
integrated within the risk management process.
We propose incorporating behavioural interven-
tions at the stages of establishing the context, as-
sessing, treating, controlling and monitoring con-
flicts of interest. Following empirical examina-
tion of the process through which conflicts of
interest threaten accounting professionals’ adop-
tion of compliant behaviour, this paper proposes
a complementary behavioural framework forman-
aging conflicts of interest.
The proposed behavioural framework highlights
possible interventions aimed at increasing in-
stances of compliant behaviour by encouraging
the following amongst accounting professionals:
(i) the expectation that the positive outcomes of
compliant decision-making will outweigh the neg-
ative outcomes; (ii) the perception that making
compliant decisions is less difficult than making
alternative decisions; (iii) the formation of highly
ethical judgements; and (iv) a low propensity to
morally disengage. Since all the insights revealed
by the empirical results are related to accounting
professionals’ state of mind and their objectivity,
the framework developed on the basis of these in-
sights will help to strengthen their independence
in fact. Arguably, the enhancement of accounting
professionals’ independence in fact will lead to bet-
ter management of conflicts of interest (Bazerman
and Gino, 2012; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman,
2010; Williford and Small, 2013). Interestingly, the
proposed behavioural interventions apply to sim-
ilar categories of conflict of interest – this is be-
cause the empirical results across different conflicts
of interest, as considered in this study, lead to sim-
ilar findings. The consideration of different cate-
gories provides strong empirical evidence for the
observed relationships. As a result, our comple-
mentary behavioural risk management framework
can add value for firms, institutions, governments
and decision-makers.
Ourwork offers somemore implications for pro-
fessional accountants, executive directors, regula-
tory bodies, executive training and academic re-
search. The results provide professional accoun-
tants and executive directors with insights into
the possible cognitive bias and noise inherent in
their judgement and thus deepen their understand-
ing of the possibly devastating effects of bias on
the quality of their opinions and decisions. Their
failure to address conflicts of interest, and the
subsequent cognitive bias and noise that perme-
ate the fabric of strategic decision-making, may
lead to another financial crisis. We propose a be-
havioural framework, conceptualized as a man-
agerial decision-making support system that will
guide them in avoiding such cognitive bias and
noise. Regulatory bodies, such as the Financial
Services Authority, FSA may be guided by our
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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framework to strengthen their professional ethical
code of conduct. Our framework may also help
in training future executives with regard to how
to deal with the conflicts of interest and cogni-
tive bias associated with judgements. Other pro-
fessions (e.g. law, engineering, medicine and archi-
tecture) that face the ramifications of conflicts of
interest may use our proposed framework and the
resultant new knowledge to improve their ethics
policies.
Future academic research may attempt to sug-
gest further behavioural interventions for manag-
ing the risk of conflicts of interest. Further empiri-
cal investigation is required to developmore robust
frameworks for addressing conflicts of interest
in the professional accounting environment. Al-
though our proposed framework is aimed at deep-
ening understanding of the psychological and cog-
nitive constructions of judgement, management
research may focus on examining other constructs,
such as the personal behavioural factors relevant
to managerial decision-making support systems.
Some limitations of this study should also be
noted. Our work involves a set of situational and
dispositional cognitive constructs and the study’s
findings should be considered in conjunction with
the corpus of relevant literature on bias and heuris-
tics (such as availability, representativeness, an-
choring and adjustment) in the decision-making
process. Moreover, our focus remains on the em-
pirical evidence for behavioural aspects, with envi-
ronmental aspects being considered mainly as part
of the discussions. Further, we collected data from
professionals with the Big Four accounting firms
in the UK, which might have constrained the gen-
eralizability of our results. Finally, while our work
builds on some literature from the corporate gover-
nance domain, we invite future research to make a
more direct contribution to corporate governance
of conflicts of interest in the professional account-
ing environment.
Funding
This paper is based on an empirical study con-
ducted by Maria Ishaque for her PhD. The au-
thor received a PhD grant/studentship from An-
glia Ruskin University, UK.
References
Adams, J. S., A. Tashchian and T. H. Shore (2001). ‘Codes
of ethics as signals for ethical behavior’, Journal of Business
Ethics, 29, pp. 199–211.
Adler, R. andG. Liyanarachchi (2020). ‘Towardsmeasuring pro-
fessionalism in accounting’, Accounting & Finance, 60, pp.
1907–1941.
Afifah, U., R. N. Sari, R. Anugerah and Z. M. Sanusi (2015).
‘The effect of role conflict, self-efficacy, professional ethical
sensitivity on auditor performance with emotional quotient as
moderating variable’, Procedia Economics and Finance, 31, pp.
206–212.
Agle, B. R., D. W. Hart, J. A. Thompson and H. M. Hendricks
(2014). Research Companion to Ethical Behavior in Organiza-
tions: Constructs and Measures. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Amali, J. W. (2010). ‘Motivated to be unethical’, International
Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 5, pp. 55–69.
Andersen, S. C. and M. Hjortskov (2016). ‘Cognitive biases in
performance evaluations’, Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 26, pp. 647–662.
Arens, A. A., M. S. Beasley and R. J. Elder (2002). Auditing and
Assurance Services: An Integrated Approach, 9th edn. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Ayal, S. and F. Gino (2012). ‘Honest rationales for dishonest
behavior’. In M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (eds), The So-
cial Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and
Evil, pp. 149–166. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological
Association.
Ayers, S. and S. Kaplan (2003). ‘Review partners’ reactions to
contact partner risk judgements of prospective clients’. Avail-
able at https://asu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/review-
partners-reactions-to-contact-partner-risk-judgements-of-pr
[accessed 10 July 2017].
Bandura, A. (1986). Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A
Social Cognitive Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bandura, A. (1991). ‘Social cognitive theory of self-regulation’,
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50,
pp. 248–287.
Bandura, A. (1999). ‘Moral disengagement in the perpetration
of inhumanities’, ResearchGate, 3, pp. 193–209.
Bandura, A. (2002). ‘Social cognitive theory in cultural context’,
Applied Psychology, 51, pp. 269–290.
Bandura, A. (2006). ‘Guide for constructing self-efficacy scales’.
In T. Urdan and F. Pajares (Eds), Self-Efficacy Beliefs of Ado-
lescents, pp. 307–337. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Pub-
lishing.
Bandura, A. (2008). ‘Social cognitive theory’, International En-
cyclopaedia of Communication, 10, pp. 4654–4659.
Bazerman, M. H. and F. Gino (2012). ‘Behavioral ethics: toward
a deeper understanding of moral judgement and dishonesty’,
Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 8, pp. 85–104.
Bedard, J. C., D. R. Deis, M. B. Curtis and J. G. Jenkins (2008).
‘Riskmonitoring and control in audit firms: a research synthe-
sis’,Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 27, pp. 187–218.
Bhattacharjee, S., M. J. Maletta and K. K. Moreno (2017). ‘Au-
dit reviewers’ judgments inmultiple client audit environments’,
Behavioral Research in Accounting, 29, pp. 1–9.
Bobek, D. D., A. M. Hageman and R. R. Radtke (2015). ‘The
effects of professional role, decision context, and gender on the
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
14 M. Ishaque, R. Attah-Boakye and F. Yusuf
ethical decision making of public accounting professionals’,
Behavioral Research in Accounting, 27, pp. 55–78.
Bobek, D. D., D. W. Dalton, B. E. Daugherty, A. M. Hageman
and R. R. Radtke (2016). ‘An investigation of ethical environ-
ments of CPAs: public accounting versus industry’,Behavioral
Research in Accounting, 29, pp. 43–56.
Butler, M. J., H. L. R. O’Broin, N. Lee and C. Senior (2016).
‘How organizational cognitive neuroscience can deepen under-
standing of managerial decision-making: a review of the re-
cent literature and future directions’, International Journal of
Management Reviews, 18, pp. 542–559.
Cabrera-Frias, L. (2012). ‘The ethics of professional skepti-
cism in public accounting: how the auditor–client relationship
impacts objectivity’. Available at https://repository.library.
georgetown.edu/handle/10822/557686 [accessed 2 July 2018].
Cain, D. M., G. Loewenstein and D. A. Moore (2005). ‘Coming
clean but playing dirtier: the shortcomings of disclosure as a
solution to conflicts of interest’. In D. A. Moore, D. M. Cain,
G. Lowenstein and M. H. Bazerman (eds), Conflicts of Inter-
est: Challenges and Solutions in Business, Law, Medicine and
Public Policy, pp. 104–125. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Cheng, P.-Y. andM.-C. Chu (2013). ‘Behavioral factors affecting
students’ intentions to enrol in business ethics courses: a com-
parison of the theory of planned behavior and social cognitive
theory using self-identity as a moderator’, Journal of Business
Ethics, 124, pp. 1–12.
Clements, C. E., J. D. Neill and O. S. Stovall (2012). ‘Inherent
conflicts of interest in the accounting profession’, Journal of
Applied Business Research, 28, pp. 269–276.
Cohen, J. R., C. Hayes, G. Krishnamoorthy, G. S. Monroe and
A. M.Wright (2012). ‘The effectiveness of SOX regulation: an
interview study of corporate directors’, Behavioral Research in
Accounting, 25, pp. 61–87.
Cremer, D. D., R. van Dick, A. Tenbrunsel, M. Pillutla and J. K.
Murnighan (2011). ‘Understanding ethical behavior and de-
cision making in management: a behavioural business ethics
approach’, British Journal of Management, 22, pp. S1–S4.
Curtis, M. B. (2006).Whistleblower Mechanisms: A Study of the
Perceptions of Users and Responders. London: The Institute of
Internal Auditors.
de Graaf, F. J. (2019). ‘Ethics and behavioural theory: how do
professionals assess their mental models?’, Journal of Business
Ethics, 157, pp. 933–947.
di Florio, C. V. (2012). ‘Conflicts of interest and risk governance’.
Available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1365171491600 [accessed 2 July 2017].
Dopuch, N., R.R. King, R. Schwartz and P. Zhang (2003). In-
dependence in Appearance and in Fact: An Experimental In-
vestigationDiscussion of ‘Independence in Appearance and in
Fact: An Experimental Investigation’,Contemporary Account-
ing Research, 20 (1), pp. 79–119.
Dowling, C. (2009). ‘Appropriate audit support system use: the
influence of auditor, audit team and firm factors’, The Ac-
counting Review, 84, pp. 771–810.
Fairchild, R., D. Gwilliam and O. Marnet (2019). ‘Audit within
the corporate governance paradigm: a cornerstone built on
shifting sand?’,British Journal of Management, 30, pp. 90–105.
Gond, J. P., A. El Akremi, V. Swaen and N. Babu (2017). ‘The
psychological microfoundations of corporate social responsi-
bility: a person-centric systematic review’, Journal of Organi-
zational Behavior, 38, pp. 225–246.
Green, J. and E. Zimiles (2013). ‘Conflicts of interest’, Investiga-
tions Quarterly, 1, pp. 8–12.
Guest, P. M. (2019). ‘Does board ethnic diversity impact board
monitoring outcomes?’, British Journal of Management, 30,
pp. 53–74.
Guiral, A., W. Rodgers, E. Ruiz and J. A. Gonzalo (2010). ‘Eth-
ical dilemmas in auditing: dishonesty or unintentional bias?’,
Journal of Business Ethics, 91, pp. 151–166.
Hair, J. F., C. M. Ringle and M. Sarstedt (2011). ‘PLS-SEM: in-
deed a silver bullet’, Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice,
19, pp. 139–152.
Hair, J. F., C. M. Ringle andM. Sarstedt (2013). ‘Editorial - par-
tial least squares structural equation modeling: rigorous ap-
plications, better results and higher acceptance’, Long Range
Planning, 46, pp. 1–12.
Henseler, J., G. Hubona and P. A. Ray (2016). ‘Using PLS path
modeling in new technology research: updated guidelines’, In-
dustrial Management & Data Systems, 116, pp. 2–20.
Holland, P. C. (2008). ‘Cognitive versus stimulus–response theo-
ries of learning’, Learning & Behavior, 36, pp. 227–241.
Holt, N., A. Bremner, E. Sutherland, M. Vliek, M. W. Passer
and R. E. Smith (2015). Psychology: The Science of Mind and
Behaviour, 3rd edn. London: McGraw-Hill Education.
IESBA (2015). 2015 Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Pro-
fessional Accountants. New York: International Federation of
Accountants.
IESBA (2018). 2018 Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Pro-
fessional Accountants. New York: International Federation of
Accountants.
Ishaque, M. (2019). ‘Managing conflict of interests in profes-
sional accounting firms: a research synthesis’, Journal of Busi-
ness Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04284-8.
Ishaque, M. (2020). ‘Cognitive approach to understand the
impact of conflict of interests on accounting professionals’
decision-making behaviour’,Accounting Forum, 44, pp. 64–98.
Iskandar, T. M. and Z. M. Sanusi (2011). ‘Assessing the effects
of self-efficacy and task complexity on internal control au-
dit judgement’, Asian Academy of Management Journal of Ac-
counting and Finance, 7, pp. 29–52.
Iyer, V.M. andD.V.Rama (2004). ‘Clients’ expectations on audit
judgements: a note’,Behavioral Research in Accounting, 16, pp.
63–74.
Johnson, R. N. and G. R. Hansen (2011). ‘Audit fees and engage-
ment profitability’, The CPA Journal, 81, pp. 64.
Juhari, R. J., Z. Mohd-Sanusi, R. A. Rahman and N. B. Omar
(2013). ‘Auditors’ independence, experience and ethical judge-
ments: the case of Malaysia’, Journal of Business and Policy
Research, 8, pp. 100–119.
Kadous, K., S. J. Kennedy and M. E. Peecher (2003). ‘The ef-
fect of quality assessment and directional goal commitment
on auditor’s acceptance of client-preferred accounting meth-
ods’, The Accounting Review, 78, pp. 759–778.
Kahneman, D., A. M. Rosenfield, L. Gandhi and T. Blaser
(2016). ‘Reducing noise in decision making’,Harvard Business
Review, 94, pp. 18–18.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1984). ‘Choices, values and
frames’, American Psychologist, 39, pp. 341–350.
Kock, N. (2015). ‘Common method bias in PLS-SEM: a full
collinearity assessment approach’, International Journal of e-
Collaboration, 11, pp. 1–10.
Kock, N. and G. S. Lynn (2012). ‘Lateral collinearity and mis-
leading results in variance-based SEM: an illustration and
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Conflicts of Interest in Professional Accounting Firms 15
recommendations’, Journal of the Association for Information
Systems, 13, pp. 546–580.
Lo, B. andM. J. Field (eds) (2009).Conflict of Interest inMedical
Research, Education and Practice.Washington, D.C.: National
Academies Press.
Lowry, P. B. and J. Gaskin (2014). ‘Partial least squares (PLS)
structural equation modeling (SEM) for building and testing
behavioral causal theory: when to choose it and how to use
it’, IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication, 57, pp.
123–146.
Moore, C., J. R. Detert, L. K. Trevino, V. L. Baker and D. M.
Mayer (2012). ‘Why employees do bad things: moral disen-
gagement and unethical organizational behavior’, Personnel
Psychology, 65, pp. 1–48.
Moore, D. A., D. M. Cain, G. Lowenstein and M. H. Bazerman
(2005). Conflicts of Interest: Challenges and Solutions in Busi-
ness, Law, Medicine and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Moore, D. A. and G. Loewenstein (2004). ‘Self-interest, auto-
maticity and the psychology of conflict of interest’, Social Jus-
tice Research, 17, pp. 189–202.
Moore, D. A., L. Tanlu andM. Bazerman (2010). ‘Conflict of in-
terest and the intrusion of bias’, Judgment and Decision Mak-
ing, 5, pp. 37–53.
Moore, D. A., P. E. Tetlock, L. Tanlu and M. H. Bazerman
(2006). ‘Conflicts of interest and the case of auditor indepen-
dence: moral seduction and strategic issue cycling’, Academy
of Management Review, 31, pp. 10–29.
Naranjo-Gil, D., G. Cuevas-Rodríguez, Á. López-Cabrales and
J. M. Sánchez (2012). ‘The effects of incentive system and cog-
nitive orientation on teams’performance’,Behavioral Research
in Accounting, 24, pp. 177–191.
Nelson, M. W. (2004). ‘A review of experimental and archival
conflicts-of-interest research in auditing’. Available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=511383 [accessed 15 August 2017].
Nguyen, D. D., L. Nguyen and V. Sila (2019). ‘Does corpo-
rate culture affect bank risk-taking? Evidence from loan-level
data’, British Journal of Management, 30, pp. 106–133.
Oseni, A. I. (2011). ‘Unethical behavior by professional accoun-
tant in an organization’, Research Journal of Finance and Ac-
counting, 2, pp. 106–111.
Palmer,N. (2013). ‘The effects of leader behavior on follower eth-
ical behavior: examining the mediating roles of ethical efficacy
and moral disengagement’, PhD thesis, College of Business
Administration, London.
Pasewark, W. R. and R. E. Viator (2006). ‘Sources of work–
family conflict in the accounting profession’, Behavioral Re-
search in Accounting, 18, pp. 147–165.
Persellin, J. S. (2013). ‘The influence of PCAOB inspections on
audit committee members’ judgments’, Behavioral Research in
Accounting, 25, pp. 97–114.
Pierce, A. (2007). Ethics and the Professional Accounting Firm:
A Literature Review. Edinburgh: The Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland.
Pierce, B. and B. Sweeney (2004). ‘Cost–quality conflict in au-
dit firms: an empirical investigation’,European Accounting Re-
view, 13, pp. 415–441.
Rigotti, T., B. Schyns and G. Mohr (2008). ‘A short version of
the occupational self-efficacy scale: structural and construct
validity across five countries’, Journal of Career Assessment,
16, pp. 238–255.
Robertson, J. C. (2010). ‘The effects of ingratiation and client in-
centive on auditor judgment’, Behavioral Research in Account-
ing, 22, pp. 69–86.
Rodgers, W. (1997). ThroughputModeling: Financial Information
Used by Decision Makers. Bingley: JAI Press.
Rodgers,W. (2006).Process Thinking: Six Pathways to Successful
Decision Making. New York: iUniverse.
Rodgers, W. (2009). Ethical Beginnings: Preferences, Rules and
Principles Influencing Decision Making. New York: iUniverse.
Rodgers, W. and S. A. Fayi (2019). ‘Ethical pathways of internal
audit reporting lines’, Accounting Forum, 43, pp. 1–26.
Rodgers, W. and S. Gago (2001). ‘Cultural and ethical effects on
managerial decisions: examined in a throughput model’, Jour-
nal of Business Ethics, 31, pp. 355–367.
Rodgers, W. and S. Gago (2006). ‘Biblical scriptures underlying
six ethical models influencing organizational practices’, Jour-
nal of Business Ethics, 64, pp. 125–136.
Roth, S. (2012). ‘Professional accountants’ ethical intent – the im-
pact of job role beliefs and professional identity’. Available at
https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/handle/123456789/40871 [accessed 17
March 2017].
Salehi, M. (2009). ‘In the Name of Independence: with Regard
to Practicing Non-Audit Service by External Auditors’, In-
ternational Business Research, 2(2), https://doi.org/10.5539/ibr.
v2n2p137 [Accessed 23 Jul. 2016].
Tenbrunsel, A. E. (2005). ‘Commentary: bounded ethicality
and conflicts of interest’. In D. A. Moore, D. M. Cain, G.
Loewenstein and M. H. Bazerman (eds), Conflicts of Inter-
est: Challenges and Solutions in Business, Law, Medicine and
Public Policy, pp. 96–103. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Thagard, P. (2007). ‘The moral psychology of conflicts of inter-
est: insights from affective neuroscience’, Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 24, pp. 367–8211.
Tian, Y., B.M. Tuttle andY.Xu (2015). ‘Using incentives to over-
come the negative effects of faultline conflict on individual ef-
fort’, Behavioral Research in Accounting, 28, pp. 67–81.
Trotman, K. T., A. M. Wright and S. Wright (2005). ‘Auditor
negotiations: an examination of the efficacy of intervention
methods’, The Accounting Review, 80, pp. 349–367.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974). ‘Judgment under uncer-
tainty: heuristics and biases’, Science, 185, pp. 1124–1131.
UK and Ireland’s Consultative Committee of Accountancy
Bodies (2011). ‘Ethical dilemmas case studies: profes-
sional accountants in public practice’. Available at http://
www.icaew.com/∼/media/corporate/files/technical/ethics/
ethical%20case%20studies/ccabeg%20case%20studies%
20accountants%20public%20practice.ashx [Accessed 1 Jan.
2015].
Williford, K. andD. Small (2013). ‘Establishing an effective com-
pliance program: an overview to protecting your organization’.
Available at http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/
eaecp.cfm [accessed 2 September 2017].
Wongpinunwatana, N. and P. Panchoo (2014). ‘Creating self-
efficacy in internal auditors for information technology au-
dits: an on-the-job training perspective’, International Journal
of Management and Information Systems, 18, pp. 213–222.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
16 M. Ishaque, R. Attah-Boakye and F. Yusuf
Maria Ishaque is a Lecturer in Accounting at the University of Essex, where she also serves as an
Accreditation Officer for the Accounting Group. Her research interests include ethics in professional
accounting, behavioural accounting and cognitive aspects of decision-making. She is an early career
researcher with publications in accounting, finance and management journals.
Rexford Attah-Boakye is a Lecturer in Accounting at the University of Hull, where he also serves as
Faculty Director of the Degree Apprenticeship Programme. His areas of specialty include integrated
financial reporting, accounting, accountability, corporate governance, social and environmental ac-
counting. He has published in accounting, finance and management journals.
Fatima Yusuf is a Lecturer in Accounting at the University of Leicester, where she is also a member of
the Research in Accounting, Society and Accountability (RASA) Unit. Her research interests include
auditing, environmental accounting and accountability practices of corporate organizations. She is an
early career researcher with publications in accounting, finance and management journals.
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end
of the article.
Supporting information.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
